Dalit and federalism-Mahendra Lawoti

SEP 27 -

Federalism has been the agenda of the marginalised, Madhesi and indigenous nationalities but while some Dalits support it, others do not strongly identify with it and some even oppose it.   Some Dalits fear that they would become minorities in the provinces, as they have been under a unitary state, and hence federalism could be detrimental to their interests.
Since federalism is going to be adopted, the question for Dalits is which model of federalism would benefit them more.  Even though the 11-14 provinces model, which is  a poly-ethnic identity model because it recognises identities of multiple ethnic groups in the country at the provincial and sub-provincial level, may not directly benefit the Dalits as it does the indigenous nationalities and Madhesis, it will nevertheless advance Dalit interests indirectly in several ways compared to the 5-7 provinces model, which is a mono-ethnic
model where the caste hill Hindu elite (CHHE) will form a majority, and hence dominate, all or most provinces, in addition to dominating the centre.
In the provinces of the 11-14-state model, the indigenous nationalities would have to actively seek votes from other groups, including Dalits, because the dominant indigenous nationalities groups will not form majority in any province. This dynamic will facilitate in empowering the Dalits. The Dalits would be in a stronger bargaining position to make demands and address their concerns and needs, in addition to joining the provincial governments than in the 5-7 provinces model where the CHHE can form provincial governments with its own votes. 
When members of multiple groups lead different provincial governments, the Dalit leaders and their political parties will also get more opportunities to play off various communities and their leaders against each other and the centre to address Dalit issues.  They can support and align with groups and political parties that support and champion their group’s causes.  Parties aspiring to form governments in the provinces of the 11-14 provinces model would have to seek Dalit and their organizations’ support.  This dynamic will provide space for the Dalit to address their problems to some extent either through the center or various provinces. If the same group dominates the centre and provinces, as in the 5-7 provinces model, political spaces for the Dalit will not exist or be fewer. 
Likewise, the chances of Dalits becoming chief ministers would be higher in the 11-14 provinces model than in the 5-7 provinces model because the former offers coalitional opportunities for Dalit political parties, if and when they emerge, while it would be difficult to win against the CHHE in provinces in the 5-7 provinces model. The assumption here is not that the indigenous nationalities and Madhesis would generously empower the Dalits. The Dalits have to mobilise or at least vote based on their issues. Once that happens, the indigenous nationalities and Madhesi parties would have a higher need to respond and concede to some of their demands.
On the other hand, the chance of CHHE becoming chief ministers and controlling all or most provincial legislatures is very high in the 5-7 provinces’ mono-ethnic federal model. The influence of Madhesi, indigenous nationalities and Dalit would be significantly less in the in the 5-7 provinces model.
The chances of the problem of untouchability being addressed sooner and more earnestly could be higher in the 11-14 provinces model than in the 5-7 province model. As a group of people whose rituals and lifestyles and worldviews are based on the deeply entrenched sense of purity and untouchability, the CHHE leadership that would dominate the provinces in the 5-7 model would be less likely to introduce effective policies to end untouchability or sincerely implement them. They could even offer relatively more resistance. On the other hand, in provinces where the indigenous nationalities are the largest group, the chances of introducing anti-untouchability policies sooner would be higher, especially if the Dalits put pressure, because even though the indigenous nationalities practice untouchability, the practices are not as entrenched in them through their values, rituals, and symbols. Dalit leaders and writers have argued that Brahmanbad is the cause of untouchability and if that is the case, then it is fair to assume that untouchability would be more entrenched and difficult to overcome in provinces where people strongly embedded with Brahminical culture dominate politics.
Likewise, Dalit mobilisation could have higher chances of making more impact in smaller-sized provinces. Ideally Dalits all over Nepal should mobilise simultaneously but that may not be a realistic scenario. Like the indigenous nationalities who are mobilised more in the East, the Dalit could mobilise more in some localities. If Dalits in some localities mobilise, then they would have higher chances of impacting policies in small-sized provinces. To impact larger-sized provinces, more Dalits in more localities will have to mobilise, which might take more time and effort.
The discussion points to possible benefits for Dalits from federalism, more so from the 11-14 provinces model. However, Dalit rights should be legally protected and enforced strictly in all provinces. The chances of provincial government introducing additional laws to protect and promote Dalit interests and sincerely implementing such laws, however, would probably be higher in the 11-14 provinces model because the provinces would not be dominated by people socialised into caste hierarchy.
Sufficient political mobilisation of Dalits to have a significant impact in provinces could take some time. Until then and for beyond as well, and to facilitate Dalit mobilisation, institutions that protect Dalit rights should be established. I have elsewhere pointed out how non-territorial federalism could provide some power to the Dalits (The Post, July 10, 2010) even though this mechanism is less powerful than territorial federalism. The important point is that it will nonetheless contribute towards empowering Dalits.
Dalit-named provinces, which significant sections of Dalits are demanding, may not facilitate self-governance because Dalits would be minorities in those provinces. Even in the Far West region where Dalits are more concentrated, the CHHE form large majorities due to much the smaller population of hill indigenous nationalities in the region. However, even though Dalits may not become the ruling group in such provinces, Dalit-named provinces would have significant symbolic value for the community.  For a group that has been regarded as the lowest caste, symbolic equality gained through Dalit-named provinces could be significant. In addition, localities and districts where Dalits are in majorities should be delineated to facilitate Dalits to have local self-governance.
Dalits have often emphasised on proportionate representation, which is necessary but may not be sufficient for their inclusion and empowerment.  Even if extra representation as the Dalits have demanded is fulfilled, it may not be enough because the Dalits would still constitute a minority. Hence, additional mechanisms, some of which are pointed out above are necessary to protect them and facilitate their inclusion in different arenas.
source: ekantipur.{2012-09-28}